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Trade Credit in China: Exploring the Link between Short-Term Debt and Payables 
Abstract: Trade credit constitutes an essential element of short-term financing for most 
firms, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises. This paper investigates the 
dynamics between short-term bank debt and payables among 1,525 Chinese small and 
medium-sized listed companies over the period of 2008–2016. The results suggest that an 
increase in stock and receivables is financed by both bank credit and payables. In addition, 
we find that bank credit and payables substitute each other. We also uncover a strong 
substitution effect among weak firms, possibly linked to the fact that weak firms struggle to 
access additional bank finance and thus are forced to rely on suppliers to support their 
growth. The substitution effect between payables and bank credit is robust to different cash 
conversion cycles and to the firm’s liquidity. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms’ ability to cover their financing needs linked to daily operations (that is, to pay 
salaries, bills and suppliers regularly) plays a key role in their ability to survive and succeed. 
A lack of short-term finance can rapidly drive a firm out of business, since it implies firms’ 
inability to retain a skilled workforce and access materials and services from suppliers. In 
fact, even if short-term financing needs (that is, working capital) can also be covered by 
issuing new equity, via retained profit or by raising long-term debt, the cost and, in the case 
of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the difficulties linked to accessing them 
makes such choices not feasible. Firms typically cover short-term financing needs by using 
cash available in the bank and by relying on two alternative forms of short-term finance: bank 
credit and trade credit. The former is provided by banks in the form of short-term loans, 
overdrafts, invoice discounting, contract discounting, etc. It is granted according to a 
creditworthiness evaluation that, in turn, is based on the historical financial information that 
firms provide to the lender. In fact, the literature stresses that SMEs are characterized by a 
high information asymmetry that compromises banks’ capability to properly evaluate SMEs’ 
creditworthiness (Bharath et al., 2007; Moro et al., 2015; Shin and Kolari, 2004). Trade credit 
is provided by suppliers through payment extensions (typically between 30 and 90 days). 
Interestingly, suppliers do not suffer from the information asymmetry banks face, since they 
make decisions according to whether the buyer pays regularly, information that is accessed 
by suppliers irrespective of buyers’ ability to produce information or willingness to share it 
(Cuñat, 2006; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Summers and Wilson, 2002). However, payables 
may be an expensive source of finance for firms (Cuñat, 2006; Petersen and Rajan, 1994): 
when customers can choose between paying the full amount in 30 days or enjoying a discount 
of 2% if they settle the invoice in full in 10 days, the use of 20 extra days of credit has an 
implied annualized interest rate of 36.5%. To sum up: firms that use payables may enjoy a 
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very flexible source of finance that is easier to access than bank finance. At the same time, 
payables may be more expensive than bank finance. 
The decision to use payables and bank credit is not necessarily an easy one. In a 
context where buyers enjoy discounts if they pay immediately, firms can decide to use the 
two sources of credit as alternatives: They can decide to cover any additional financing needs 
by expanding bank credit as long as this source of finance is accessible, to keep financing 
costs low. They may switch to payables when they are not able to access additional bank 
finance. This approach implies a substitution effect between payables and bank credit (Huang 
et al., 2011; Psillaki and Eleftheriou, 2015), so that bank credit and credit from suppliers are 
inversely related. However, firms can also pursue a diversification strategy: they can decide 
to use both banks’ and suppliers’ credit in an attempt to maintain a mix of sources so that if 
one of them dries up (e.g., if the bank decides to reduce the credit previously given or a 
supplier that used to provide credit decides to cut it down), firms can rely on the other ones. 
If this is the case, additional financial needs are proportionally covered by both additional 
payables and bank debt, so that firms follow a complementarity logic in the use of payables 
and bank debt (Andrieu et al., 2018). In this scenario, the additional cost incurred by the 
firms can be seen as an insurance firms buy to be sure that they will not be financially 
constrained (Cuñat, 2006). 
It is apparent that the link between suppliers’ credit and bank credit (and cash 
holdings) is a very relevant topic from the academic, regulatory and practical points of view. 
However, the increasing literature has not provided a final explanation of the use of different 
sources of finance. Even more surprisingly, little attention has been paid so far to the 
rationale of the use of credit provided by suppliers in the Chinese context. Strangely, this is 
the case irrespective of the impact China has on the world economy and the important role 
played by SMEs in China as major drivers of its economic growth. Thus, we address the need 
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for exploration of the determinants of the use of bank credit vis-a-vis supplier credit in the 
case of Chinese SMEs. 
Our research builds on the existing literature on the use of credit from suppliers 
(Deloof, 2003; Deloof and Jegers, 1996; Kling, 2018; Psillaki and Eleftheriou, 2015) by 
exploring the relationship between trade credit and bank credit. In particular, we examine 
whether SMEs tend to follow a complementarity or substitution logic in financing their 
working capital needs in the context of Chinese SMEs, a context where typically buyers are 
granted discounts when they pay immediately. We use a sample containing 1,525 small and 
medium-sized listed companies, obtained from the Wind dataset, for the period of 2008–
2016. The time window we rely on allows us to explore the post-financial-crisis use of trade 
credit in a context that has been only marginally affected by the Great Recession.  
Following Kling (2018), we explore firms’ financing decisions by using a framework 
where the change in sales determines additional working capital needs (change in stock and 
change in receivables) that in turn affect the additional use of bank debt and payables. To 
explore the substitution/complementarity between bank and supplier credit, we focus on the 
link between payables and bank debt, since in the case of a substitution (complementarity) 
effect we should find a negative (positive) relationship between these two variables. We 
control for firms’ characteristics and quality, since these aspects can affect their capability to 
access bank credit (and the link between bank credit and credit from suppliers). It is apparent 
that we deal with a framework that is relatively complex. Thus, to explore the links among 
our variables, we do not use traditional regressions but rely on Structural Equation 
Modelling. In addition, because of the time effect between the change in the sales and change 
in the working capital, we rely on lagged variables.  
Our evidence suggests that firms tend to follow a substitution logic: they finance their 
additional working capital needs with debt and switch to payables when they are not able to 
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access bank debt. The results hold also for weak and high-quality firms and are robust to 
alternative variables. 
This paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a review of trade credit 
and bank credit for SME financing. Our data set, variables and methodology are described in 
the section three, followed by the empirical analysis and robustness checks. The last section 
discusses our main findings and concludes. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The amount of finance needed to cover operations (i.e., working capital) depends on 
the cash conversion cycle: the greater the amount of stock of raw material and the longer the 
time to produce the final product and/or the time to sell the product and cash in from the sale, 
the larger is the amount of finance needed. In fact, not all the cash available to the firm is 
used to cover the financial needs linked to the cash conversion cycle. Kling (2018) proposes a 
theory of operational cash holding based on the cash conversion cycle (Gitman, 1974; 
Richards and Laughlin, 1980). His model suggests that firms do not cover short-term needs 
entirely by using the cash available but rely on short-term bank debt and on suppliers’ 
finance. In fact, because of uncertain cash flows, firms retain precautionary cash holding in 
case debt holders impose financial constraints. Cash holdings, in turn, reduce insolvency risk, 
enhancing access to short-term finance so that they also have an indirect effect on firms’ 
capability to access alternative sources of short-term finance (Belghitar and Khan, 2013; 
Kling et al., 2014). All in all, not only are cash holdings retained for operational needs but 
also are kept to address unexpected shocks and facilitate credit access (Kling, 2018; Lins et 
al., 2010). Past research also suggests that a longer cash conversion cycle is associated with 
smaller liquid reserves (Deloof, 2001; Kim et al., 1998) and that there is a positive 
relationship between cash holdings and payables but a negative one between cash holdings 
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and receivables (Wu et al., 2012). Finally, cash holdings of the supplier can have a significant 
redistribution effect: cash-rich SMEs are found to be more likely to extend trade credit 
supporting business partners that have to rely on such credit because of difficulties in 
accessing bank financing (McGuinness et al., 2018). 
However, as suggested by Kling (2018), cash holdings are not the only factor 
affecting firm’s capability to access further short-term credit: those firms that perform better 
have a propensity to apply for cheaper bank debt (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997) and are more likely to be successful in applying for bank finance (Baas and 
Schrooten, 2006; Berger and Udell, 2006). In fact, small, young and opaque firms typically 
struggle to access bank finance (Berger and Udell, 2006; Boissay and Gropp, 2007; Howorth 
and Reber, 2003): when they are young they lack a long and established history that proves 
that they are successful (Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht, 2007) and they are not able to 
exploit a consolidated social capital (Ferrary, 2003; Howorth and Moro, 2006). They can 
even be adversely affected by banking lending strategy because of a misinterpreted level of 
risk attached to them (Samatas et al., 2019). When firms are more established, they suffer 
from information asymmetry (Van Caneghem and Van Campenhout, 2012; Wette, 1983) 
because of their lack of willingness to share information (Lowry et al., 2014; Rheinbaben and 
Ruckes, 2004) or lack of capability to provide lenders with the information they need 
(Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Moro et al., 2015). The consequence is that lenders face 
moral hazard issues (Berger et al., 2005) that can only partially be sorted out via the request 
of additional collateral and cannot be solved by any rise in interest charged to the firm, since 
the latter can even increase the moral hazard issues (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Wette, 1983). 
When firms face liquidity tightening or are credit rationed, they have to explore and consider 
alternative sources of finance that are more expensive, and, among them, trade credit plays a 
major role (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Kling, 2018).  
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Trade credit in the form of credit provided by the supplier (payables) is a very popular 
source of finance for any type of firm, accessible to them since their inception. Research 
suggests that there are two major forms of trade credit (Cuñat, 2006). The first is called a 
one-part contract and gives the customer the choice of settling the invoice immediately or 
delaying the payment for a period of time: delaying the payment for a period of time is a 
form of “free” credit to the customer. The second type is called two-part contract. In this 
case, the customer has two alternative options: either to settle the invoice immediately and 
enjoy a discount or delay the payment and lose the discount. Actually, both forms of trade 
credit are popular, the use of the one-part or two-part contract being mainly linked to the 
country/region’s culture or the established habits at the industry level (e.g., in the U.S. Ng et 
al. (1999) find that trade credit is offered by only one-fourth of US firms, while in Germany, 
it is very popular). Intriguingly, questions can be raised about the rationality of relying on the 
two-part contract, since the offered discounts (e.g., 3% for a payment due in 60 days) imply 
that trade credit bears high costs, up to 40%+ (Elliehausen and Wolken, 1993; Kohler et al., 
2000; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Summers and Wilson, 2002), even if some research finds 
opposite evidence (Marotta, 2005). In fact, determining the cost of a two-part contract is quite 
complex: on the one hand, further credit extension is typically provided for free; on the other 
hand, late payers can incur nonmonetary costs such as suppliers’ refusal to provide 
material/services in the future or the denial of trade credit.  
Interestingly, the suppliers of informationally opaque firms are in a good position to 
evaluate their customers’ creditworthiness (Mian and Smith, 1992; Tsuruta, 2008). The direct 
access to data about regular payments and about customers’ quality (exploiting the network 
of business relations the suppliers have) allows suppliers to obtain detailed and timely 
information about customers’ current situation (Smith, 1987). The consequence is that as 
long as the customer is quite regular in paying the suppliers, suppliers’ credit can be easier to 
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access than bank credit. Thus, firms can follow the approach of substituting bank credit with 
trade credit when they struggle to access the former. Hernandez-Canovas and Martınez-
Solano (2007) find a substitution relation between trade and bank credit, since the payables 
compensate for a reduction in the use of bank credit arguably because of firms’ difficulties in 
accessing bank debt. Similarly, Ogawa et al. (2013), by using micro data of Japanese small 
firms, find that SMEs, especially small and young firms with little access to bank credit, 
depend on large suppliers that support them by granting trade credit. As far as the European 
context is concerned, evidence suggests that bank credit–rationed SMEs in euro areas are 
more likely to use payables to finance their working capital (Casey and O’Toole, 2014). 
However, even when firms are able to access bank credit, they may want to keep 
alternative sources of finance open for different reasons. First, relying too much on one or 
few banks (with one bank that serves as the main one) can be dangerous, since it can grant 
the bank an information advantage that can generate a holdup problem for the firm (Farinha 
and Santos, 2002; Howorth et al., 2003; Ongena and Smith, 2001). In this context, payables 
may turn to be a viable – though not inexpensive – alternative to bank finance (Matias Gama 
and Van Auken, 2015) that allows firms to reduce their dependence on the bank(s). Second, 
payables can be quite easily extended when the buyer is not able to pay on time and, as long 
as such an extension happens only occasionally, it is typically granted for free (Cuñat, 2006; 
Tsuruta, 2008). At the same time, any extension on a bank loan is subject to complex 
renegotiations and additional costs. In these scenarios, the extra cost linked to the use of trade 
credit can be interpreted as an “insurance premium” that the firm pays to diversify its sources 
of finance so that it can 1) reduce the holdup issue and 2) keep alternative sources of finance 
open (Cuñat, 2006). The insurance role is supported by recent research that indicates that 
payables are a significant complement to bank credit for SME financing during financial 
crises (Carbó‐Valverde et al., 2016; Mcguinness and Hogan, 2016; Psillaki and Eleftheriou, 
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2015). 
Research finds evidence of the complementarity between payables and bank credit: 
Uesugi and Yamashiro (2008) and Taketa and Udell (2007) discover that small firms in Japan 
are bank dependent but view payables and loans as complementary debt instruments rather 
than substitutes. Mcguinness and Hogan (2016) argue that even though SMEs rely more on 
bank finance, payables play an important role in easing the financial burden during financial 
crises, and Huyghebaert et al. (2007) point out that the financing behaviour of SMEs is driven 
by the different position that bank lenders and suppliers take in the case of financial distress: 
compared to bank lenders, suppliers are willing to help by renegotiating the outstanding debt 
or by granting additional debt. Thus, suppliers are perceived as a complementary source of 
finance. Andrieu et al. (2018) also provide empirical support for a complementarity by using 
survey data on European SMEs from 2009 to 2014. 
As discussed so far, the large majority of literature explores the relationship between 
bank credit and trade credit by looking at US, European or Japanese SMEs (Casey and 
O’Toole, 2014; Psillaki and Eleftheriou, 2015; Uesugi and Yamashiro, 2008). However, 
China is the second largest economy in the world and is characterized by a bank-based 
financial system (even though equity market and corporate bond market have been 
developing rapidly in recent years). This implies that Chinese firms have to rely more on debt 
financing (i.e., bank lending and possibly trade credit) to raise external funds. Statistics on 
Aggregate Financing to the Real Economy (AFRE) by the People’s Bank of China reveal that 
bank loans take a share of 68.13% in total outstanding financing provided by the financial 
system to the real economy (2017), while net financing from corporate bonds represents 
10.55% and equity 3.81%. However, in China, bank lending is significantly biased towards 
larger firms, especially those state-owned enterprises that are in possession of helpful 
political affiliations and implicit guarantees by the government (Wu et al., 2014). Du et al. 
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(2015) investigate the financing behaviours of Chinese private SMEs during 2000–2006 and 
find that building social capital does help them to raise more short-term debt and political 
affiliations could be helpful in obtaining long-term debt. In contrast to state-controlled firms, 
Chinese SMEs are more likely to turn to trade credit or other channels of informal financing, 
due to the limited bank finance they can access. 
In China, trade payables typically bear an early payment discount. For example, 
Chinese suppliers often offer an early payment discount (2/10, net 30), which means that if 
buyers settle within 10 days after delivery, they can obtain a 2% discount on the total 
payment. Otherwise, they need to make the full payment within 30 days of delivery. This 
means that buyers could receive a trade credit (deferred payment) for 20 days at an 
annualized interest cost of 36.5%, which is a much higher rate than that of bank loans with a 
similar maturity. Irrespective of the fact that in China trade credit bears quite a high cost, 
trade payables represent a large share of Chinese firms’ current liabilities: the average use of 
trade payables by Chinese nonfinancial listed firms has increased by nearly triple from 
1023.61 million RMB in 2008 to 3457.01 million RMB in 2017, and it represents 48.43% of 
the average firm’s current liabilities and 41.28% of total liabilities (2017 data). At the same 
time, the average use of short-term loans by Chinese nonfinancial listed firms almost doubled 
(from 739.65 million RMB in 2008 to 1700.31 million in 2017). The proportion in the 
average firm’s current liabilities declined from 32.31% (in 2008) to 22.59% (in 2017) and in 
the average firm’s total liabilities from 28.07% (in 2008) to 18.50% (in 2017). This evidence 
suggests a substantial increase in the financial needs of Chinese firms that was covered by 
both bank and trade credit, even if the latter played a greater role, possibly suggesting easier 
access to trade credit with respect to bank credit. As far as SMEs are concerned, they 
experienced a similar trend in the use of short-term loans and trade payables during the 
period of 2008–2017. Specifically, the average use of payables by nonfinancial listed SMEs 
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in China increased from 181.49 million RMB in 2008 to 894.44 million RMB in 2017, and it 
represented 49.21% of their current liabilities in 2017 (48.53% in 2008). At the same time, 
even though their average use of short-term loans also increased from 154.74 million RMB in 
2008 to 710.60 million RMB in 2017, this proportion in their current liabilities was reduced 
from 31.32% in 2008 to 23.60% in 2017. The statistic suggests that SMEs also increased the 
use of credit (bank and trade) to finance their activities, with a prevalence of trade credit with 
respect to bank debt. All in all, the data provide some evidence of preference towards trade 
credit debt for both larger and smaller Chinese firms, even if this is not clear evidence of 
substitution.1
In addition to the general statistics, only recently has research started to explore this 
area. Allen et al. (2005) emphasize that trade credit makes a great contribution to China’s 
economic growth, especially for the private sector. Ge and Qiu (2007) find that non-state-
owned firms use more trade credit than state-owned ones in China to fund their potential 
growth opportunities. Wu et al. (2014) explore the determinants of trade credit in China and 
find that more trade credit is provided in areas with a higher level of regional social trust. As 
far as the relationship between bank credit and payables, both Zhu et al. (2007) and Huang et 
al. (2011) find that payables substitute for bank loans for private firms that are shut out of 
formal credit markets. However, Du et al. (2012) suggest that payables cannot effectively 
substitute for bank loans. Interestingly, Lin and Chou (2015) indicate that both a 
complementary and substitution effect coexist, since they find there is a substitution effect 
between bank credit and accounts payables but a complementary effect between bank credit 
and accounts receivables. Their findings are similar to the work of Yang (2011) using U.S. 
data. 
However, a major question remains unanswered: do SMEs use trade credit because 
1 All the data are obtained from Wind database. 
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they are bank credit constrained, or do they expand trade credit as a hedging strategy in order 
to counterweight any further reduction of credit from banks? In other words, are Chinese firm 
implementing a substitution strategy (because of difficulty in accessing credit) or are they 
implementing a complementarity strategy (to deal with the risk of being credit constrained)? 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Methodology 
The use of payables is mainly driven by firms’ need to finance their working capital, 
that is, stock and receivables issued by the firm, as suggested by Kling (2018)’s model. In 
turn, as discussed above, the use of payables can be affected by firms’ quality and the 
accessibility of short-term bank credit (Belghitar and Khan, 2013; Kling, 2018; Kling et al., 
2014; Lins et al., 2010). All in all, the use of payables is the result of the demands of working 
capital finance and the capability to access short-term finance. Thus, the dynamics can hardly 
be described with a standard linear regression (or two simultaneous linear regressions) model 
because of the interdependence of trade credit and bank credit and the fact that both are in 
turn affected by variables that are interrelated. In other words, what affects the trade 
credit/bank debt mix is the result of relatively complex links that cannot be easily captured by 
a simpler linear regression model. 
We explore the determinants of the use of payables and its substitution or 
complementarity with bank credit by using a structural equation modelling analysis (Figure 
1). 
------ 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
------ 
Our model focuses on changes in the levels of the variables. It looks jointly at what 
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affects the change in working capital needs of the firm (change in sales, change in stock, 
change in receivables) and what affects the capability of the firm to access different sources 
of finance in order to cover the working capital needs (change in bank credit and change in 
suppliers’ credit). In detail, it suggests that the change in the sales of the firm affects both the 
change in stock and the change in receivables issued by the firm and, thus, the change in 
working capital needs of the firm. The firm can finance the additional working capital by 
using payables (easier to access but more expensive) and bank credit (cheaper but harder to 
access): If the firms follow the substitution logic, they will tend to have a negative 
relationship between the change in bank debt and the change in payables, in the sense that an 
increase in the demand for working capital will trigger a greater use of payables. If, on the 
other hand, firms follow the complementarity logic, they will finance the additional working 
capital needs by expanding both payables and bank debt, and, thus, the relationship will be 
positive. A third possible, even if quite unlikely, scenario could be that the use of payables 
and bank debt are completely independent from each other, and in this case their relationship 
will not be significant. To control for firms’ capability to access bank credit, we also consider 
changes in firm performance (i.e., profitability, etc.) and changes in cash holdings: we expect 
a positive relationship between firms’ performance measure and the amount of bank debt 
used to support working capital needs, since for more profitable and solid firms it is easier to 
access bank finance than for weaker ones; in addition, following Kling (2018), we expect a 
greater use of bank credit to be associated with greater cash holdings. 
Interestingly, the increase in sales implies an immediate effect on the amount of 
account receivables and stock needed to satisfy customers requests. This implies that the firm 
faces an almost immediate effect in terms of increased working capital needs. At the same 
time, the evaluation of the creditworthiness of the firm from the bank point of view is based 
on the official annual (occasionally semi-annual) financial report. This implies a time lag 
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between the performance of the firm and the use of bank debt. Thus, in the model we assume 
that the past year (one-year lag) change in firms’ performance affects their capability to 
access bank credit. 
Moreover, additional variables are included to capture the financial status and 
operational situation of SMEs, which may produce a significant impact on their financing 
behaviour. These variables include return on equity (ROE), cash holding to total asset (cash), 
change in (growth rate of) total profit (gprofit) and change (growth rate of) sales (gsale).  
3.2 Data 
Even if China is a bank-based economy, SMEs have been confronted with financial 
constraints, especially after the financial crisis, as the supply of bank loans flowed to larger 
firms because of safety consideration. In such a context the use of payables increased, and 
they now make up a larger share of firms’ current liabilities. In fact, the total size of payables 
in China has experienced a fourfold increase from 181.49 million RMB in 2008 to 717.91 
million RMB in 2016, and they represented 51.06% of firms’ current liabilities and 44.46% 
of total liabilities in 2016 (Wind dataset). To test the dynamics between payables and bank 
credit, we use 1,525 Chinese small and medium companies listed on the SME and GEM 
(Growth Enterprise Market) boards, obtained from the Wind dataset. Listed companies in 
China have to follow strict regulatory requirements in terms of information disclosure that 
allows for accessing detailed financial statement. In addition, there are externally audited 
procedures for listed companies so that the financial information can be considered reliable. 
Our sample covers the period of 2008–2016 in order to examine the financing choice 
between payables and bank debt after the recent financial crisis. To mitigate the impact of 
outliers, we winsorize variables at 1% and 99%, including ROE and gprofit. 
------ 
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TABLE 1 HERE 
------ 
Table 1 shows that Chinese SMEs have a high level of cash holding (averaging 
24.53% of total assets, 463.1 million RMB). Firms in the sample hold a relatively lower 
amount in bank loans (averagely 328.2 million RMB) than in payables (averaging 421.9 
million RMB). In terms of growth, sample firms present an average annual growth rate of 
23.81% in sales. Meanwhile, Chinese SMEs present sound profitability in terms of average 
return on equity (15.47%) and growth rate of total profit (24.62%). 
4. Analysis 
The model considers a cash conversion cycle that is shorter than one year, i.e., any 
change in sales generates a change in working capital needs that is absorbed the same year. 
Thus, the model explores the relationship between any change in sales, change in 
stock/receivables and related change in short term loans/payables in the same year (t). As 
discussed above, the lagged variables are those related to change in cash holding and change 
in the performance of the firm, since for the performance of the firm to influence its credit 
access, it has to be visible to the bank, i.e., already recorded in the annual financial report. 
Thus, it has to be the previous year’s performance (t-1). The results of the regressions of the 
structural equation model (SEM) are reported in Table 2 (first set of regressions). 
------ 
TABLE 2 HERE 
------ 
In general terms, the model presents Bentler and Raykov (2000) squared multiple 
correlations between .007 and .604. The root mean squared error (RMSE) of approximation 
is .061 below the upper 90% bound of .069, suggesting a proper fit of the model. Akaike 
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(1987)’s information criterion is 534,238.953, while the Bayesian information criterion 
534,371.046 (Schwartz, 1978). The comparative fit index is .971, while the Tucker-Lewis 
index is 0.936, both relatively close to 1, suggesting quite a good fit (Bentler, 1990). Finally, 
the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) is .033, below the suggested threshold 
of .08 (Hancock and Mueller, 2006), indicating a sound goodness of fit of our model. 
Moving forward to the detailed analysis of the framework, the structural equation 
model provides support to our basic arguments. The change in sales positively affects both 
the change in stock and the change in trade receivables: greater sales imply a greater need for 
stock in terms of raw material, work in progress and final products to be sure that customers’ 
requests are met. Similarly, any positive change in sales implies a significant positive change 
in the receivables: firms tend to sell on credit, and any increase in sales implies an increase in 
the receivables issued by the firm. Thus, as expected the increase in sales implies a positive 
change in the working capital needs of the firm. 
The model also explains that any increase in stock needs is financed by the firm using 
both short-term loans and payables, since both paths are positively related to stock and are 
significant. Similarly, the increase in the amount of credit given to customers is financed both 
by the short-term loans and by the use of credit provided by suppliers, since also in this case 
the change in stock and change in receivables are positively related to the change in payables.  
An increase in short-term loans implies a decrease in payables (-.091). This 
relationship suggests that firms that can access short-term debt to finance their working 
capital use payables less, or, put another way, there is a substitution in the use of debt and 
payables. The change in short-term loans is negatively but not significantly related to firms’ 
change in return on equity. In other words, a profitable firm has a reduced need for credit 
since it is able to finance (at least partially) its current activities with the profit it generates. 
At the same time, weak firms struggle to access finance from banks and thus should lean on 
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their suppliers more and more as a source of finance. A change in firms’ cash holdings has a 
negative and significant impact on the use of both bank debt and trade payables. This 
evidence is a bit unexpected since, according to Kling, a reduced amount of cash holdings 
should have a negative effect on access to bank credit (Kling, 2018) and, considering the 
emerging substitution effect that we discovered, a possible positive effect on the use of 
suppliers’ credit.  
To explore further the role of supplier credit and bank credit, we run two additional 
tests. First, we re-estimate the model adding a path between payables and financial 
performance of the firm. The path is not significant (marginally) and negative, suggesting 
that, if there is any relationship between firm performance and use of payables, this is 
negative (weaker firms rely more on payables). This evidence provides support to the model 
proposed by Kling (2018). 
Second, we re-estimate the model by splitting the sample into three subgroups and 
considering the top third and bottom third of firms. To identify the firms belonging to the 
bottom and top thirds, we clustered them according to their average change in performance in 
the period. The change in performance was measured exploring the growth of the firms and 
their growth in profitability in terms of ROE. The results are reported in Table 2 (second and 
third set of regressions). 
In general terms, the Bentler and Raykov (2000) squared multiple correlations are 
between .001 and .819 in the case of top third of firms and between .046 and .526 in the case 
of the bottom third of firms. Akaike (1987)’s information criterion is 121,841.354 in the case 
of top firms and 229,599.077 in the case of the bottom ones. The comparative fit index is 
.995 (top) and .850 (bottom) relatively close to 1, suggesting quite a good fit (Bentler, 1990). 
Finally, the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) is .019 (top) and .080 (bottom), 
below the suggested threshold of .08 (Hancock and Mueller, 2006). 
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Turning our attention to top firms, the SEM suggests that any change in sales 
increases the trade receivables issued by the firms as well as the stock, even if in the latter 
case the relation is not significant. The additional working capital is financed using both 
suppliers and bank credit. In addition, the relationship between short-term loans and the use 
of payables is negative and significant, supporting the substitution effect (-.095). This implies 
that strong firms tend to finance the increase in working capital by substituting debt and 
payables. 
In the case of weak firms, an increase in sales has a positive impact on both 
receivables and stock. The additional stock positively impacts both the use of short-term debt 
and the use of payables to suppliers (positively and significantly related to payables and to 
short-term loans) and receivables (positively and significantly related to payables and short-
term loans). In addition, any increase in the use of short-term debt has a significant effect on 
the use of payables by reducing it (-.126). The coefficient is bigger than in the case of strong 
firms. This may suggest a greater impact of the substitution effect. However, any 
interpretation based on comparing the coefficients has to be done carefully, since the overall 
impact is the result of the joint effect of the coefficient and the value by which it is 
multiplied. All in all, also in the case of weak firms, evidence suggests that firms finance 
their additional working capital needs with both bank and supplier finance. However, the 
evidence suggests a possibly stronger substitution effect, conceivably linked to the fact that 
weak firms struggle to access additional finance and thus are forced to rely more on suppliers 
to support their growth. 
4.2 Robustness checks 
It can be argued that our results are affected by the way in which we measure the 
variables. In fact, we look at the change in sales that affects the change in stock and 
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receivables that in turn is expected to affect the change in short-term debt and the change in 
payables. It can be argued that this is not the right approach, since the levels of stock and 
receivables determine the overall amount of finance needed. In turn, banks’ decision to lend 
(which we find to impact the use of payables) is affected by the amount of credit asked for by 
an organization. All in all, it can be pointed out that we should look at the levels of the 
variables instead of the change. Thus, we re-estimate the model using levels of core variables 
in year t including short-term loans (shortloans), payables (trade_p), stock (stock) and 
receivables (trade_r), and one-year-lagged levels of controls including return on equity 
(lROE), cash holding (lcash) and total profit (ltprofit). The results of the regressions of the 
SEM are reported in Table 3A (Robustness tests with levels of variables).  
------ 
TABLE 3 Panel A and B HERE 
------ 
When we look at the overall model, the Bentler and Raykov (2000) squared multiple 
correlations are between .166 and .786. Akaike (1987)’s information criterion is 878,135.598. 
The comparative fit index is .922, relatively close to 1, suggesting quite a good fit (Bentler, 
1990). Finally, the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) is .046, below the 
suggested threshold of .08 (Hancock and Mueller, 2006). As far as the demand side of 
working capital is concerned, the SEM suggests that all the relationships between key 
variables maintain the same direction and significance. In particular, the substitution effect is 
confirmed: the short-term loans coefficient is negative and significant (-.046). When we look 
at the subsamples (not reported for reasons of space), both strong firms and weak firms 
present a negative relationship between the amounts obtained in short-term loans and 
payables, with coefficients of -.109 and -.090 respectively.  
It can also be argued that the results we obtain are affected by the variables we use. In 
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particular, there are different ways to measure the performance of an organization, and 
financial institutions typically rely on a battery of measures to decide whether to lend. To 
address this limitation, we re-estimate the model using alternative measures of performance 
and cash holding: return on asset (ROA) and growth rate of asset (gasset). In addition, we 
include the liquidity ratio (LR) as a replacement or cash holding (cash), since firms’ decisions 
to use bank short-term loans or payables to finance their working capital needs can also be 
affected by the liquidity of the firm. This happens for two reasons. First, more liquid firms 
are perceived as lower risk by the bank, while less liquid ones are considered higher risk, 
since there is greater concern about their capability to repay loans. If it is more likely that less 
liquid firms are credit constrained by banks, it is more likely that they use payables to finance 
their operation. Second, less liquid firms can lack enough internal cash to finance their 
additional working capital needs. Thus, they have to turn to external sources of finance. 
However, if the banks are not very supportive to finance them because they are considered 
higher risk, SMEs are forced to use more receivables. All in all, we can conclude that less 
liquid firms rely more on receivables and, for them, the substitution effect is in operation. 
The results are reported in Table 3B.  
When we look at the overall model, the Bentler and Raykov (2000) squared multiple 
correlations are between .007 and .604. Akaike (1987)’s information criterion is 501,517.356. 
The comparative fit index is .972, relatively close to 1, suggesting quite a good fit (Bentler, 
1990). Finally, the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) is .033, below the 
suggested threshold of .08 (Hancock and Mueller, 2006). As far as the analysis at variable 
level, there are no changes in the results in general. All in all, the additional econometric tests 
support further the substitution effect between bank credit and payables (-.09). When we look 
at the split dataset (i.e., strong vs. weak firms; results not reported here for reasons of space), 
the results support the substitution effect between bank credit and payables in both strong 
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firms (-.092) and in weak firms (-.130), and it is significant. The evidence also supports our 
argument about the possibility that the substitution effect is more relevant in the case of weak 
firms.  
We also check whether our results are robust at industry level. In fact, there are 
industries that enjoy short cash conversion cycles and thus do not have major issues in 
financing their working capital needs, while those that face long cash conversion cycles have 
to rely heavily on loans and receivables. To pursue the analysis, we split the dataset into three 
subsamples: The first one contains construction, agriculture, science and technology, mining, 
and real estate firms (422 obs), that is, firms typically characterized by a long cash 
conversion cycle. The second subsample includes firms that operate in service and trade (766 
obs), that is, firms that operate in contexts that typically enjoy a short cash conversion cycle. 
The third subsample contains manufacturing firms (4,269 obs) that are characterized by a 
mixed/dubious cash conversion cycle. Since data show the prevalence of firms that operate in 
manufacturing where the cash conversion cycle is dubious, it is important to look also at 
these firms in order to explore whether our original results are mainly affected by firms that 
have an uncertain cash conversion cycle. The SEM results are reported in Table 4A. 
------ 
TABLE 4 Panel A and B HERE 
------ 
In general terms, the Bentler and Raykov (2000) squared multiple correlations are 
between .000 and .797 in the case of long cash conversion cycle firms, between .012 and .538 
in the case of short cash conversion cycle firms, and between .057 and .483 in the case of 
manufacturing firms. Akaike (1987)’s information criterion is 43,199.989 (long), 75,882.068 
(short) and 404,312.563 (manufacturing). The comparative fit index is 1.000 (long), .935 
(short) and .834 (manufacturing), relatively close to 1, suggesting quite a good fit (Bentler, 
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1990). Finally, the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) is .027 (long), .049 
(short) and .080 (manufacturing), below the suggested threshold of .08 (Hancock and 
Mueller, 2006). 
Interestingly, the results do not suggest any difference in the use of payables and bank 
credit. In the case of all three subsamples, firms follow the substitution logic: they use 
payables as a substitute for short-term bank loans when they are not available. The coefficient 
of short-term loans is negative in both cases, but it is -.092 in the case of the short cash 
conversion cycle, -.118 in the case of the long cash conversion cycle, and -.104 in the case of 
manufacturing firms. However, as already discussed, one cannot simply interpret this as 
evidence that, in the case of long cash conversion cycle firms, the substitution effect is 
greater than in the case of the short cash conversion cycle and manufacturing firms, since the 
impact is the result of the coefficient and value of the variable. Cash holding (ldcash) has a 
significant and negative impact on both the use of short-term loans and trade payables among 
manufacturing firms and the use of short-term loans among short cash conversion cycle 
firms, while it has an insignificant impact on the use of both short-term loans and trade 
payables among long cash conversion cycle firms. This indicates that a high level of cash 
holding in the case of manufacturing firms substitutes both short-term loans and payables: 
cash holdings are used to finance working capital. At the same time, in the case of firms that 
enjoy short cash conversion cycles, a high level of cash holdings reduces their use of short-
term loans. 
Finally, we also test the role of cash conversion cycles measured as “working capital 
days” that we define as receivables + stock – payables divided by total costs and multiplied 
by 365 as a control variable. The results are reported in Table 4B.  
In general terms, the Bentler and Raykov (2000) squared multiple correlations are 
between .007 and .604. Akaike (1987)’s information criterion is 603,704.662. The 
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comparative fit index is .971, relatively close to 1, suggesting quite a good fit (Bentler, 1990). 
Finally, the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) is .030, below the suggested 
threshold of .08 (Hancock and Mueller, 2006). The relationship among our main variables 
remains the same as in our basic model. Additionally, this supplementary test provides 
support for the substitution effect between short-term loans and trade payables (-.09). Quite 
unexpectedly, working capital days (ldCCC) is negatively and significantly related to the use 
of short-term loans, while it is positively but not significantly related to the use of payables. 
This indicates that firms with longer working capital days are more likely to reduce their use 
of short-term loans, but this does not mean that they use more payables. Possibly, firms with 
a longer cash conversion cycle rely more on medium- and long-term loans to cover their 
working capital needs.  
5. Conclusion 
Trade credit plays a growing role in relieving financing constraints for SMEs, 
especially in emerging markets such as China. The relationship between payables and bank 
credit has received extensive attention. Existing literature has provided evidence for the 
existence of both substitution and complementarity between these two sources of financing 
by using different samples. Actually, the use of bank debt and payables is the result of firms’ 
demand for working capital finance and capability to access short-term finance. Thus, the 
dynamics can hardly be described with a standard linear regression model. Our study 
explores the determinants of the use of payables and their substitution/complementarity with 
bank credit by using a structural equation modelling approach in the context of Chinese 
SMEs.  
We find that the increase in stock and receivables is financed by both bank credit and 
payables. In addition, we find that bank credit and payables substitute each other. 
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Specifically, both strong firms and weak firms tend to finance the increase in working capital 
by expanding the use of both short-term debt and supplier finance. In addition, we find that 
weak firms present a bigger negative coefficient between short-term loans and payables. We 
tend to interpret this evidence as the fact that there is a stronger substitution effect, possibly 
linked to the fact that weak firms struggle to access additional finance and thus are forced to 
rely on suppliers to support their growth. However, we also stress the fact that the 
coefficients cannot be easily interpreted, since the impact is the resultant of the coefficients 
and the value by which they are multiplied. 
We also run a series of tests to enhance the robustness of our analysis. First, we re-
estimate the SEM model using levels instead of changes. Second, we re-estimate the model 
using alternative measures of performance and cash holding: return on asset, liquidity and 
growth rate of asset. The results show the persistence of the substitution effect. We also 
control for the possible effect of a different cash conversion cycle in different industries by 
splitting the sample firms into three groups: long cash conversion cycles (firms in 
construction, agriculture, science and technology, mining, real estate), short cash conversion 
cycles (firms in service and trade) and manufacturing (whose cash conversion cycle is 
dubious). The results confirm the substitution between bank credit and payables, and firms 
follows the substitution logic: they use payables as a substitute for short-term bank loans 
when the latter are not available. Finally, we explore whether the firm-specific cash 
conversion cycle affects the use of trade credit vs. bank credit. We use working capital days, 
defined as receivables plus stock minus payables divided by the total costs. The results do not 
change. 
Our analysis relies on the Wind dataset, which focuses on financing data of firms. The 
fact that they are listed implies that they have to produce regular financial reports for the 
markets and that they are quite used to producing and disseminating information. This 
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implies that the firms in our sample are less opaque than smaller, unlisted firms. We cannot 
rule out that different results can be obtained by using more opaque firms that can face 
greater issues in accessing bank credit. Thus, the dataset used does not allow us to generalize 
our findings to smaller firms. However, the expectation is to find an even greater substitution 
effect in the case of more opaque firms. In fact, this limitation opens a further area of 
investigation: to explore whether the substitution effect is stronger in the case of smaller and 
more opaque firms. Since our evidence suggests a less pronounced substitution effect in the 
case of larger firms, it would also be interesting to explore whether large transparent firms 
tend to follow the substitution or the complementarity logic. An additional area of research is 
to explore whether the findings can be generalized to an alternative geopolitical context. In 
fact, previous research in Europe and the U.S. tends to provide different results, but such 
research tends to model the use of payables and bank short-term debt using linear models. 
We argue that SEM allows for a better exploration of the topic, since it allows us to consider 
the difference. 
Notwithstanding the limitations, our study clearly indicates that in the case of small 
and medium listed firms in China, short-term bank debt and payables are used in an 
interchangeable way to finance additional working capital needs linked to additional 
receivables and stock. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
trade_p 12,196 421.9 1557 0 53912 
dtrade_p 10,666 85.37 436.4 -3954 18786 
trade_r 12,196 443.9 1064 0 48336 
dtrade_r 10,666 100.3 415.1 -5257 19791 
shortloans 9,048 328.2 833.8 0 25010 
dshortloans 7,048 64.78 386.2 -5034 9513 
stock 11,943 356.8 1599 0 88924 
dstock 10,416 65.31 436.9 -4257 21109 
gsale 11,616 23.81 59.21 -97.5 3781 
ROE 12,190 15.47 13.39 -15.29 63.66 
dROE 10,656 -2.39 9.183 -72.13 78.01 
ldROE 9,129 -2.72 9.32 -63.98 75.69 
gprofit 11,612 24.62 127.6 -612.7 685.5 
dgprofit 10,082 -0.16 181.2 -1298.19 1298.19 
ldgprofit 8,553 -5.63 168.22 -1298.19 1298.19 
cash 12,196 24.53 17.26 0.112 96.03 
dcash 10,666 -0.31 14.07 -74.04 71.79 
ldcash 9,137 -0.33 14.55 -74.04 71.78 
sale 12,196 1329.84 2115.98 75.56 14144.01 
lsale 10,666 1226.237 1977.66 75.56 14144.01 
tprofit 12,196 134.99 204.89 -166.21 1325.99 
ltprofit 10,666 123.72 187.10 -166.21 1325.99 
ROA 12,196 11.34 8.93 -7.36 44.62 
dROA 10,666 -1.31 5.85 -51.99 51.99 
ldROA 9,137 -1.48 5.94 -38.41 51.98 
LR 12,196 3.54 5.561 0.07 190.9 
dLR 10,666 0.14 5.055 -145.68 104.01 
ldLR 9,137 0.14 5.37 -145.68 104.01 
gasset 11,615 36.72 55.6 -17.49 326.3 
dgasset 10,085 -0.56 79.79 -329.3 343.8 
ldgasset 8,556 -0.71 81.88 -329.34 337.81 
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Table 2: SEM results on bank loans and trade credit  
The table reports the regressions of the SEM model based on the entire sample, strong firms and weak firms, respectively. In regression 1, 
dshortloans is the change in the short-term loans and is the dependent variable that is expected to be influenced by dtrade_r (change in trade 
receivables), dstock (change in stock), ldROE (one-year-lagged change in return on equity), ldgprofit (one-year-lagged change in growth of 
profit) and ldcash (one-year-lagged change in cash holding of the firm). The second regression uses dtrade_p (the change in the trade payables) 
as the dependent variable, and the independent variables are dtrade_r (trade receivables), dstock (change in stock), ldgprofit (one-year-lagged 
change in growth of profit), dshortloans (the change in the short-term loans) and ldcash (one-year-lagged change in cash holding of the firm). 
Regression 3 models dtrade_r (change in the trade receivables) as a function of gsale (growth in sales). Regression 4 models dstock (change in 
stock) as a function of gsale (growth in sales). 
Overall firms Strong firms Weak firms 
VARIABLES dshortloans dtrade_p dtrade_r dstock dshortloans dtrade_p dtrade_r dstock dshortloans dtrade_p dtrade_r dstock 
dtrade_r 0.251*** 0.489*** 0.0827*** 0.683*** 0.203*** 0.417*** 
(0.00943) (0.00902) (0.0215) (0.0195) (0.0127) (0.0111) 
dstock 0.114*** 0.568*** 0.0689*** 0.564*** 0.488*** 0.594*** 
(0.00893) (0.00816) (0.00936) (0.00865) (0.0279) (0.0247) 
ldROE -0.464 -0.213 1.059 
(0.752) (1.263) (1.205) 
ldcash -1.164*** -0.869** -1.428* -0.950 -0.567 -0.741 
(0.418) (0.359) (0.817) (0.712) (0.606) (0.486) 
ldgprofit 0.00159 -0.0186 -0.0195 -0.119* -0.00892 -0.0188 
(0.0316) (0.0240) (0.0912) (0.0721) (0.0383) (0.0245) 
dshortloans -0.0908*** -0.0945*** -0.126*** 
(0.0122) (0.0256) (0.0171) 
gsale 2.995*** 1.245*** 3.208*** 1.297 3.299*** 1.490*** 
(0.180) (0.194) (0.357) (0.843) (0.305) (0.139) 
Constant 25.53*** 5.709 78.09*** 66.88*** 39.07*** -34.49*** 76.68*** 117.5*** 19.70** 12.78** 63.17*** 42.17*** 
(5.537) (4.687) (8.080) (8.706) (11.21) (9.461) (15.33) (36.16) (7.811) (6.152) (13.99) (6.369) 
Observations 5,457 5,457 5,457 5,457 1,246 1,246 1,246 1,246 2,369 2,369 2,369 2,369 
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Robustness tests with levels of variables and different control variables (overall firms) 
Panel A reports the regressions of the SEM model based on the entire sample. In regression 1, shortloans is level of short-term loans and is the 
dependent variable that is expected to be influenced by trade_r (level of trade receivables), stock (level of stock), lROE (one-year-lagged return 
on equity), lcash (one-year-lagged cash holding of the firm) and ltprofit (one-year-lagged total profit of the firm). The second regression uses 
trade_p (level of trade payables) as the dependent variable, and the independent variables are trade_r (level of trade receivables), stock (level of 
stock), ltprofit (one-year-lagged total profit of the firm), lcash (one-year-lagged cash holding of the firm) and shortloans (level of short-term 
loans). Regression 3 models trade_r (level of trade receivables) as a function of lsale (one-year-lagged sales). Regression 4 models stock (level 
of stock) as a function of lsale (one-year-lagged sales). 
Panel B reports the regressions of the SEM model based on the entire sample. In regression 1 dshortloans is the change in the short-term loans 
and is the dependent variable that is expected to be influenced by dtrade_r (change in trade receivables), dstock (change in stock), ldROA (one-
year-lagged change in return on asset), ldLR (one-year-lagged change in liquidity ratio of the firm) and ldgasset (one-year-lagged change in 
growth in asset of the firm). The second regression uses dtrade_p (the change in the trade payables) as the dependent variable, and the 
independent variables are dtrade_r (change in trade receivables), dstock (change in stock), ldgasset (one-year-lagged change in growth in asset 
of the firm), ldLR (one-year-lagged change in liquidity ratio of the firm) and dshortloans (the change in the short-term loans). Regression 3 
models dtrade_r (change in the trade receivables) as a function of gsale (growth in sales). Regression 4 models dstock (change in stock) as a 
function of gsale (growth in sales). 
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Panel A 
Robustness tests with levels  
VARIABLES shortloans trade_p trade_r stock 
trade_r 0.381*** 0.767*** 
(0.00719) (0.0104) 




lcash -2.438*** 4.406*** 
(0.535) (0.665) 




lsale 0.374*** 0.348*** 
(0.00543) (0.00885) 
Constant 232.8*** -224.3*** 62.34*** -39.93* 
(16.76) (18.08) (13.76) (22.43) 
Observations 7,742 7,742 7,742 7,742 
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Panel B 
Robustness tests with different controls
VARIABLES dshortloans dtrade_p dtrade_r dstock 
dtrade_r 0.257*** 0.488*** 
(0.00949) (0.00904) 




ldLR -2.975 -0.161 
(2.098) (1.860) 




gsale 3.012*** 1.234*** 
(0.181) (0.194) 
Constant 27.66*** 6.601 78.76*** 67.30*** 
(5.430) (4.703) (8.106) (8.711) 
Observations 5,463 5,463 5,463 5,463 
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Robustness tests at industry level and considering firm-specific cash conversion cycles 
Panel A reports the regressions of the basic SEM model based on the subsamples including long cash conversion cycle firms, short cash 
conversion cycle firms and dubious cash conversion cycle firms, respectively. 
In regression 1, dshortloans is the change in the short-term loans and is the dependent variable that is expected to be influenced by dtrade_r 
(trade receivables), dstock (change in stock), ldROE (one-year-lagged change in return on equity), ldgprofit (one-year-lagged change in the 
growth of profit) and ldcash (one-year-lagged change in cash holding of the firm). The second regression uses dtrade_p (the change in the trade 
payables) as the dependent variable, and the independent variables are dtrade_r (trade receivables), dstock (change in stock), ldgprofit (one-
year-lagged change in growth of profit), dshortloans (the change in the short-term loans) and ldcash (one-year-lagged change in cash holding 
of the firm). Regression 3 models dtrade_r (change in the trade receivables) as a function of gsale (growth in sales). Regression 4 models dstock 
(change in stock) as a function of gsale (growth in sales). 
Panel B reports the regression of the basic SEM. In regression 1, dshortloans is the change in the short-term loans and is the dependent variable 
that is expected to be influenced by dtrade_r (trade receivables), dstock (change in stock), ldROE (one-year-lagged change in return on equity), 
ldgprofit (one-year-lagged change in the growth of profit), ldcash (one-year-lagged change in cash holding of the firm) and ldCCC (which 
measures the cash conversion cycle of the firms). The second regression uses dtrade_p (the change in the trade payables) as the dependent 
variable, and the independent variables are dtrade_r (trade receivables), dstock (change in stock), ldgprofit (one-year-lagged change in growth 
of profit), dshortloans (the change in the short term loans) ldcash (one-year-lagged change in cash holding of the firm) and ldCCC (which 
measures the cash conversion cycle of the firms). Regression 3 models dtrade_r (change in the trade receivables) as a function of gsale (growth 
in sales). Regression 4 models dstock (change in stock) as a function of gsale (growth in sales).
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Panel A 
Long cash conversion cycle firms Short cash conversion cycle firms Dubious/mixed cash conversion cycle firms
VARIABLES dshortloans dtrade_p dtrade_r dstock dshortloans dtrade_p dtrade_r dstock dshortloans dtrade_p dtrade_r dstock 
dtrade_r -0.013 0.740*** 0.320*** 0.626*** 0.177*** 0.387*** 
-0.0356 -0.0432 -0.0373 -0.0305 -0.0097 -0.0090 
dstock 0.0571*** 0.536*** 0.221*** 0.940*** 0.549*** 0.713*** 
-0.0119 -0.0148 -0.0607 -0.0479 -0.0235 -0.0221 
ldROE 2.71 2.037 -1.142* 
-2.957 -2.991 -0.687 
ldcash -0.444 -0.404 -2.951* 0.346 -0.892** -0.939*** 
-1.95 -2.312 -1.69 -1.292 -0.3705 -0.3140 
ldgprofit -0.122 0.0539 -0.0114 -0.092 0.015 -0.001 
-0.132 -0.132 -0.123 -0.0815 -0.0288 -0.0215 
dshortloans -0.118** -0.092*** -0.104*** 
-0.059 -0.0283 -0.0135 
gsale 1.697*** 1.028 2.141*** 0.762*** 3.448*** 1.454*** 
-0.658 -1.989 -0.39 -0.243 -0.2160 -0.0904 
Constant 123.6*** -29.86 142.9*** 404.7*** 13.43 -26.76 139.8*** 59.09*** 2.726 7.480* 58.94*** 33.79*** 
-24.89 -28.96 -32.52 -98.25 -23.19 -17.28 -23.24 -14.46 -4.991 -4.139 -8.895 -3.721 
Observations 422 422 422 422 766 766 766 766 4,269 4,269 4,269 4,269 
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Panel B 
Cash Conversion Cycle 
VARIABLES dshortloans dtrade_p dtrade_r dstock 
dtrade_r 0.251*** 0.488*** 
-0.00944 -0.00904 




ldcash -1.201*** -0.866** 
-0.42 -0.361 




gsale 3.007*** 1.255*** 
-0.181 -0.195 
ldCCC -0.0580* 0.013 
-0.0301 -0.027 
Constant 25.72*** 5.476 78.01*** 66.99*** 
-5.545 -4.709 -8.093 -8.726 
Observations 5,441 5,441 5,441 5,441 
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix: 
Table I: Variables description 
This table presents descriptions of all the variables used in our analysis.  
Variable Description 
trade_p The sum of accounts payable, notes payable and advances in year t (million RMB) 
dtrade_p First-order difference of trade_p
trade_r The sum of accounts receivable, notes receivable and prepayments in year t (million RMB) 
dtrade_r First-order difference of trade_r
shortloans Short-term loans obtained from bank in year t (million RMB) 
dshortloans First-order difference of shortloans
stock Goods in stock in year t (million RMB) 
dstock First-order difference of stock
gsale Annual growth rate of sales in year t (%) 
ROE Return on equity in year t (%) 
dROE First-order difference of ROE
ldROE One-year-lagged first-order difference of ROE
gprofit Annual growth rate of total profit in year t (%) 
dgprofit First-order difference of gprofit
ldgprofit One-year-lagged first-order difference of gprofit
cash The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets in year t (%) 
dcash First-order difference of cash
ldcash One year lagged first-order difference of cash
sale Sales in year t (million RMB) 
lsale One-year-lagged sales (million RMB) 
tprofit Total profit in year t (million RMB) 
ltprofit One-year-lagged total profit (million RMB) 
ROA Return on asset in year t (%) 
dROA First-order difference of ROA
ldROA One-year-lagged first-order difference of ROA
LR Liquidity ratio in year t
dLR First-order difference of LR
ldLR One-year-lagged first-order difference of LR
gasset Annual growth rate of total assets in year t (%) 
dgasset First-order difference of gasset
ldgasset One-year-lagged first-order difference of gasset
